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NEW YORK'S ATTACHMENT STATUTE.AND Seider v. Roth HELD VALID
UNDER Shaffer v. Heitner
Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc.
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.
Historically founded upon a state's inherent power over prop-
erty situated within i4s territorial boundaries,' quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion2 often was invoked where due process considerations made in
I The notion that a state has inherent power over persons and property located within
its borders can be traced to Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws by Justice Story wherein
he espoused the concept that "the laws of every state affect, and bind directly all property,
• . . persons, . . . and acts done within [that state]." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1834). Justice Story analogized each state to a foreign nation and
reasoned that laws similar to those governing international relations should apply to asser-
tions of state jurisdiction. Id. at §§ 18-19; see Zammit, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded
and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 668, 668-69 (1975). Under this view, each state
has jurisdiction over persons and property located within the state, but the state has no
jurisdiction over things located outside its borders. STORY, supra, at §§ 18, 20. These ideas
on the jurisdictional power of states subsequently were adopted by the Supreme Court which
noted that one of the principles of public law is "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722 (1878). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44, Comments a & b (1934).
2 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S.
185 (1886); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878). There are three types of jurisdiction:
in personam, in rem and quasi in rem. In personam jurisdiction relates to the court's power
to bind a particular party to personal liability on its judgment. The court obtains personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff when he commences an action. Jurisdiction over the defendant
is obtained when he is properly served with the court's process, see D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE ch. 4 (1978), and has sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy due process consid-
erations. See note 3 infra.
A court obtains in rem jurisdiction and is empowered to decide the interests of all persons
claiming rights in certain property when it has actual or constructive possession of the prop-
erty. A court's judgment in an in rem action is binding as against "the whole world." See
SIEGEL, supra, at § 101. Under traditional analysis, the court does not have to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, but notice of the action has to be given to interested parties.
See Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Juris-
diction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739, 745-46 n.33 (1977).
In a quasi in rem action, the court must obtain jurisdiction over the property in question
pursuant to an order of attachment prior to the commencement of the action. The defendant
does not have to be subject to the court's in personam jurisdiction. The litigation, however,
relates to the interests of the defendant in the property and is binding only on him. See id.
at 746 n.33. There are two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction. In the first instance, the attached
property is related to the cause of action in which the plaintiff is attempting to assert his
rights in the attached res. The second type involves situations wherein the attached property
is unrelated to the cause of action and the plaintiff is merely using it as a predicate for
jurisdiction to ensure satisfaction of a judgment. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246
n.12 (1958); Fyr, supra, at 746 n.33. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note will be referring to
the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction. For other discussions of jurisdictional bases, see
SIEGEL, supra, §§ 101-106; Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 33, 44-53 (1978); Smith, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of
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personam jurisdiction over a defendant unavailable. 3 The viability
of this jurisdictional approach was drastically curtailed, however,
Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 600, 616-24 (1977); Developments in the Law-State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 916-17, 935-36, 948-50 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906); Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905); Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Steele
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
Originally based upon a territorial view of judicial power as enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1878), the scope of in personam jurisdiction expanded with the advent of a mobile
society and nationwide corporations. In several states, nonresidents were deemed to have
given implied consent to personal jurisdiction if an automobile accident occurred within the
state. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). Also, if a foreign corporation conducted
continuous and substantial business within a state, its "presence" within the state subjected
it to suit there. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1914);
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Developments, supra
note 2, at 919-23. In addition, if the defendant was a domiciliary of the forum state, personal
jurisdiction could be obtained over him, even if he was not presently residing therein, by
service reasonably calculated to afford him notice of the claim against him. See Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 25, Com-
ment e (1971).
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court held
that due process requirements mandate that certain "minimum contacts" exist between the
state and the defendant before in personam jurisdiction can be asserted. Such contacts work
to ensure "that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
In contrast to the minimum contacts approach taken with respect to in personam juris-
diction, due process requirements for quasi in rem jurisdiction were considered to be met by
the presence of the defendant's property in the forum and the attachment of the property
prior to the adjudication of the underlying claim. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727-28
(1878). Assuming proper notice to the defendant, such assertions of jurisdiction were consid-
ered proper because "[e]very State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-
residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropri-
ate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens." Id. at 723,
727-28; see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106, Comments a, c (1934). In Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905), overruled in part in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court
modified the quasi in rem doctrine by holding that intangible property, such as a debt, could
be attached and used as the basis for a quasi in rem action. 198 U.S. at 222. Significantly,
the Court stated that the situs of the debt is the state wherein the debtor is located. Id.
Therefore, if local law provided, a debt could be attached and provide a basis for state court
jurisdiction. Id. Although not specifically stated by the Court, Harris indicated that in a quasi
in rem action no contacts between the forum and the defendant were required beyond the
presence of the attached debt. Of course, personal jurisdiction over the debtor had to be
obtained. Id. The plaintiff's judgment in a quasi in rem action, however, was limited to the
value of the attached property and collateral estoppel would not apply to subsequent actions
against the defendant. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730-33 (1878); Note, Effect of a
General Appearance to the In Rem Cause in a Quasi In Rem Action, 25 IOWA L. REv. 329,
339-40 (1940); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023 (1973). There was much criticism of the bifurcated due process approach to jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; Von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1135-36 (1966); Zammit, supra note 1, at 676, 682-83; Developments, supra note 2, at
959-60, 965-66.
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when the Supreme Court, in Shaffer v. Heitner,4 held that there
must be minimum contacts between the defendant, the claim and
the forum before any assertion of jurisdiction could be justified.5 In
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Id. at 212. Arnold Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, commenced a shareholders'
derivative suit in a Delaware chancery court against corporate officers for breaches of duty
which subjected the corporation to substantial damages and criminal contempt fines. Id. at
189-90. Jurisdiction was acquired by sequestration of the defendants' common stock in the
corporation. Id. at 190-92. The defendants contended that jurisdiction was invalid since they
had no contacts with the forum state as required by International Shoe. Id. at 193; see note
3 supra. Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, holding that the defendants' contacts with the forum need not be considered.
433 U.S. at 195; see Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub
nom. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted the criticism levelled against the different due
process standards used to evaluate the constitutionality of in personam and in rem actions,
see note 3 supra, and stated that jurisdiction over a person's property is an "'elliptical way
of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of [a person] in a thing."' 433 U.S. at 205, 207
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note (1971)). Thus,
the Court held that, when evaluating the due process requirements for adjudicating the
interests of persons in property, the International Shoe minimum contacts test must be
applied. Id. at 212. While the existence of the defendants' property might be indicative of
other contacts which could provide a nexus between the "defendant, the State, and the
litigation," id. at 209, the Court concluded that jurisdiction could not be upheld where the
property serving as the jurisdictional predicate is wholly unrelated to the cause of action and
no other contacts with the forum exist. Id. at 208-09. Under the Shaffer facts, the Court
found it significant that the defendants, by merely purchasing stock, had not "'purposely
avail[ed] [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.'"
Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In this sense, the Court
noted that it would be unfair to assert jurisdiction over defendants who had never been in
Delaware and who had no reason to suspect that they would be subject to its jurisdiction.
See id. at 216 & n.47; note 38 and accompanying text infra. Therefore, the Court concluded
that the defendants' contacts did not meet the minimum contacts test. 433 U.S. at 216.
The Shaffer Court noted that in certain circumstances quasi in rem actions probably
would be valid without additional contacts between the forum and the property:
[When] claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy
between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's claim
to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit
from the State's protection of his interest.
Id. at 207-08 (footnotes omitted). Examples suggested by the Court included actions to ensure
the marketability of real estate, procedures to provide for resolution of disputes over posses-
sion or ownership of property, and suits involving injury upon an absentee owner's land. Id.
at 208.
The Court's holding in Shaffer was supported by the decisions of several state and lower
federal courts. See, e.g., United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
357 U.S. 569 (1958). For a broader discussion of Shaffer and its implications, see Leathers,
Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 Ky. L.J. 1 (1977); Silber-
man, supra note 2; Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment,
Jurisdiction Based on Property, and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up
the Ghost of the Res?, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 323 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Judgment
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the wake of Shaffer, the Second Circuit recently considered whether
-New York's attachment statute6 and the doctrine of Seider v. Roth,7
Attachment]; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Tide of Due Process Comes in on the Quasi in
Rem Sandcastle, 14 CAL. W.L. REv. 418 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1978).
6 Section 5201(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (NYCPLR) states that
"[a] money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet
to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor. ... N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1978). Section 6202 of the NYCPLR provides: "Any debt or prop-
erty against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject
to attachment." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6202 (McKinney Supp. 1964-1978). Section 314 of
the NYCPLR permits out-of-state service "where a levy upon property of the person to be
served has been made within the state pursuant to an order of attachment. . . ... N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 314 (McKinney 1972).
New York's attachment procedure was declared unconstitutional in Sugar v. Curtis
Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated and remanded sub nom. Cary v.
Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976), because of its ex parte nature. As a result, amendments were
promulgated recently to remedy the constitutional defects. See Ch. 860, § 1, [1977] N.Y.
Laws 1611; SEIGEL, supra note 2, at 315; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6201, commentary at 20
(McKinney Supp. 1964-1978).
7 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, the New York Court
of Appeals held that the obligation of an insurance company doing business in New York to
defend and indemnify a defendant-insured was a debt that could be attached and used as a
predicate for quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269
N.Y.S.2d at 101.
The Seider doctrine has withstood several constitutional challenges in the New York
state courts and the Second Circuit. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410
N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978)(per curiam); Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633 (1967). But see Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Podolsky,
the court held that Seider was unconstitutional on due process grounds because New York
did not provide for a limited appearance. Id. at 500. The court reasoned that, in order to
defend on the merits, a defendant would have to make a general appearance, thereby submit-
ting himself to in personam jurisdiction and personal liability. Id. at 495. On the other hand,
if the insured refused to appear, the insurer might claim that the insured breached the
cooperation clause present in most insurance contracts. Id.
In a per curiam opinion denying a rehearing in Simpson, the Court of Appeals responded
to the Podolsky decision by stating that, even if a defendant litigated a Seider-type proceed-
ing on the merits, his liability is limited to the face value of the policy. 21 N.Y.2d at 991, 238
N.E.2d at 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Shortly thereafter, the New York legislature amended §
320(c) of the NYCPLR, making provision for limited appearances in cases where jurisdiction
is predicated upon the attachment of property within New York. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW §
320(c) (McKinney 1972).
Most recently, in Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808
(1978)(per curiam), the New York Court of Appeals stressed the principle of stare decisis and
sustained the constitutionality of the Seider doctrine. Citing O'Connor with approval, id. at
891, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 809, the court reasoned that, since "the primary risks
and burdens of defending a Seider-type action rest on the insurer," the burden on the insured
is insufficient to preclude the adjudication on constitutional grounds. Id. For a discussion
of Baden and the Seider saga in New York practice, see The Survey, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
182 (1978).
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both predicated on quasi in rem jurisdiction, could withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny. In Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc.,'
the court found that the attachment of a debt pursuant to New
York's attachment statute was a valid predicate for quasi in rem
jurisdiction where sufficient contacts exist between the defendant
and the forum state to satisfy the minimum contacts test Of
greater significance, however, was the court's subsequent decision
in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 0 wherein the constitutionality
of Seider attachments was upheld."
Intermeat, Inc., a New York corporation, sued to recover dam-
ages for an allegedly wrongful rejection of a shipment of imported
meat by American Poultry Inc. 2 After the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant was lacking, '3 Intermeat was permitted to attach
a debt owed to American Poultry by a corporation doing business
in New York.'4 Judgment was entered for Intermeat 5 and American
Both the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals have held that Seider may
only be invoked by New York residents. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 366
N.E.2d 253, 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1977). See also Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315,
288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968).
Other jurisdictions, concluding that the insurer's obligation is not an attachable debt,
have rejected the Seider approach. See, e.g., Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D.Vt. 1970);
Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976), overruling
Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); State v. Lasky, 454
S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (1976); Johnson
v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I.
240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housley v.
Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967). Other courts have concluded that Seider
is not a valid procedure because there are insufficient contacts between the insured and the
forum state. See, e.g., Hunt v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 1977);
Camire v.Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976). The conceptual and constitutional
problems with the Seider doctrine have been well documented by the commentators. See,
e.g., Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1075 (1968);
Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16
BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations
and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 563 (1967) thereinafter cited as
Garnishment of Intangibles]; Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 58 (1968); Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A
Chip Off The Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REV. 1426 (1968).
- 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
9 Id. at 1023.
20 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978).
579 F.2d at 202.
2 575 F.2d at 1018.
,3 Id. American Poultry maintained no office in New York and had not consented to
service of process through the Secretary of State. Id. at 1019.
" Id. at 1018. The amount of the debt exceeded the claim in question. Id. The district
court found that American Poultry's contacts with New York satisfied the requirements of
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Poultry appealed to the Second Circuit.'"
Writing for a unanimous panel," Judge Gurfein utilized a'two-
tier approach to determine whether federal jurisdiction was appro-
priate, stating that "[t]he defendant must be subject to service of
process under the law of the state of the forum, a question of state
law, . . . and the exercise of such jurisdiction must be consistent
with due process, a question of federal law."' 8 Noting that New York
provides that jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation may be
predicated on the attachment of a debt located within the state,' 9
the Intermeat court considered whether in this case the procedure
comported with the minimum contacts standard enunciated in
Shaffer.20 While stating that the presence of the debt within the
Shaffer for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 1018-19. The contract in question was a form
contract drafted by the plaintiff in New York and used in five previous transactions between
the parties. Id. at 1019. Each contract contained an arbitration clause committing the parties
to arbitrate in New York. Id. In addition, the district court found that the defendant's sales
to New York companies aggregated as much as $7,000,000 per year and its purchase of
imported meat from New York companies comprised 25-30% of its business. These purchases
were paid for by checks mailed to the New York companies. Id.
11 Id. at 1018. American Poultry initially rejected the meat because it was marked
"Tasmeats" rather than "Richardson Production" as was ordered. Id. at 1019. The defendant
sold the meat, and the contract price less $19,800.99 was remitted to Intermeat. Id. The
district court found that it was common knowledge in the trade that "Tasmeats" is the export
name for "Richardson Production." Id. at 1024. The court held, therefore, that the meat was
wrongfully rejected and entered judgment for Intermeat. Id.
,s Id. at 1018-19. In addition to challenging the district court's assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, American Poultry appealed the lower court's finding that rejection of the meat
was improper. Id. at 1019. Intermeat, although awarded judgment by the district court,
contended that interest at the statutory rate was insufficient and the lower courts should have
awarded its actual bank financing charges. Id.
"The Second Circuit panel consisted of Judges Lumbard, Timbers and Gurfein.
,' 575 F.2d at 1020 (citations omitted); see Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 440 (1952).
, 575 F.2d at 1020; see note 6 supra.
575 F.2d at 1022-23. The exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Intermeat was neces-
sary due to the restrictive nature of New York's long-arm statute which permits courts to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents only in certain statutorily-defined instan-
ces. Section 301 of the NYCPLR authorizes a court "to exercise such jurisdiction over persons
.. . as might have been exercised heretofore." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1972).
This section incorporates the "doing business" test which evaluates a defendant's aggregate
activities in determining whether the defendant is present for jurisdictional purposes. See
Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964);
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). In addition to the
codification of case law under § 301, § 302 authorizes assertions of jurisdiction for causes of
action arising from certain enumerated activities within the state. Thus, if the defendant
transacts business within the state or commits a tortious act other than defamation in the
state, he is subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York. In addition, if the nondomiciliary
commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury in New York and regularly conducts
or solicits business within New York or should have expected the act to cause harm within
New York and conducts a substantial amount of interstate or international commerce, he will
1979]
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state was to be viewed as only one contact between American Poul-
try and New York, -' the court found it significant that the contract
upon which relief was sought had substantial connection with New
York.22 Moreover, since the defendant had repeatedly committed
itself to arbitration in New York with respect to numerous business
transactions involving the state,2 the Second Circuit concluded that
it would not be "unfair or unreasonable [to require the defendant]
to defend in New York an action arising out of such commerce." '
In O'Connor, the plaintiff brought suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York to recover damages for the wrong-
ful death of her husband who, while inspecting a construction site
for his employer, was fatally struck by a motorgrader negligently
operated by an employee of defendant Lee-Hy Paving Corporation.2
Since the defendant, a Virginia corporation, lacked contacts with
be subject to in personam jurisdiction. Finally, if a person owns property located in New York,
out-of-state service will be permissible and jurisdiction may be acquired. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§ 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978-1979); see Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d
159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965); SIEGEL, supra note 2, at §§ 84-86.
21 575 F.2d at 1022. Since the fortuitous presence of property within New York will
generally be insufficient by itself to justify an assertion of jurisdiction, the Intermeat court
noted that "some attachments still valid under New York law, and still constituting valid
bases (so far as New York Law is concerned) for quasi in rem jurisdiction, will no longer satisfy
the applicable due process requirement." Id. (emphasis in original).
1 Id. at 1023. A requirement of the "minimum contacts" test is that the claim have a
"substantial connection" with the forum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252
(1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). In referring to the
contract, Judge Gurfein remarked that "if it was not born in New York, [it] was at least
conceived [there]." 575 F.2d at 1023.
21 Id. at 1023. An arbitration clause similar to that in Intermeat has been interpreted as
a consent to personal jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing arbitration. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1977); Victory Transp.
Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
It has been suggested that one factor to be used in determining whether quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion is constitutional in a particular case is whether a party "knowingly [assumes] some risk
that the State will exercise its power . . ." over property within the state. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F.
Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). It can be argued that an arbitration clause in previous
contracts renders it foreseeable to the parties that New York courts would become involved
if a controversy developed.
21 575 F.2d at 1023. Reaching the merits, the court affirmed the district court's holding
that American Poultry had wrongfully refused the shipment of imported meat. Id. at 1024.
Turning to the question of damages, the Second Circuit noted that New York law does not
limit "incidental damages" to those enumerated in § 2-710 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. The court concluded that, under this liberal view, the plaintiff was entitled to financing
charges resulting from the breach. Id.
11 437 F. Supp. 994, 995 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 239 (1978). The plaintiff and her husband were residents of New York. 437 F. Supp.
at 995.
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New York, the plaintiff invoked the Seider doctrine and attached
the contractual obligations of two insurance companies doing busi-
ness in New York to defend and indemnify the defendant under
policies of liability insurance.
28
On appeal to the Second Circuit,2 Lee-Hy Paving sought to
have the attachment vacated, contending that jurisdiction predi-
cated on a Seider attachment violates due process. 28 Writing for a
unanimous court,29 Judge Friendly stated that the Shaffer decision's
"overriding teaching" is that when assertions of jurisdiction are
evaluated, "courts must look at realities and not be led astray by
fictions.""0 Viewing Seider in this light, the Second Circuit endorsed
the notion that this type of attached jurisdiction is "sui generis.' '3,
2 437 F. Supp. at 995. The operator of the motorgrader also was named as a defendant.
Id. The obligations of the defendants' insurance companies to defend and indemnify provided
a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 6201 & 5201(a) of the NYCPLR. Seider v. Roth, '17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); note 6 supra.
" After granting the attachment order, Judge Dooling certified interlocutory appeals
from his decision. 579 F.2d at 197; see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
11 579 F.2d at 197. In addition to the O'Connor suit, the Second Circuit considered
appeals from three other cases wherein the lower court sustained Seider. Schwartz v. Boston
Hospital for Women, Nos. 78-7044, 7076 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 1977), involved a suit for medical
malpractice which occurred in Massachusetts. 579 F.2d at 196 n.1. In Kotsunis v. Superior
Motor Express, No. 78-7058 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1977), the plaintiff sued for the damages resulting
from an automobile accident in Maryland in which her husband was fatally injured. 579 F.2d
at 196 n.1. In Ferruzzo v. Bright Trucking Inc., No. 78-7047 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 1977), the,
plaintiff sued for injuries suffered in a collision in Indiana with a tractor-trailer owned by a
Wisconsin corporation and driven by a Wisconsin resident. 579 F.2d at 196 n.1.
2 The O'Connor panel was comprised of Judges Gurfein, Meskill and Friendly.
11 579 F.2d at 200.
22 Id. The court quoted with approval from district court Judge Dooling's opinion:
Seider v. Roth and Simpson are sui generis in the field of jurisdiction. They
cannot be pigeon-holed as in rem or in personam. They are in real terms in
personam so far as the insurer is concerned. For the named defendant the suit is
only an occasion of cooperation in the defense; his active role is that of witness.
Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 579
F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978)).
The O'Connor court first considered the defendants' argument that the fall of Harris v.
Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), in Shaffer, necessitates the downfall of Seider. See 579 F.2d at 198-
99. On several occasions, the New York Court of Appeals discounted the direct action aspects
of Seider and emphasized its basis as a Harris-type quasi in rem action. See Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967); Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1966). The Second
Circuit, however, distinguished Seider from Harris, reasoning that in a Seider action "a
judgment for the plaintiff will not deprive a defendant of anything substantial that would
have been otherwise useful to him. He could not recover, sell or hypothecate the covenant to
indemnify; its utility is solely to protect him from liability .... " 579 F.2d at 199. In
addition, the court reasoned that, unlike the Harris situation, the debt attached in a Seider
action is related to the cause of action, since the contractual obligations to defend and
indemnify were procured for the purpose of financial security in the event of such litigation.
Id.
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Noting the interest of the plaintiff is being able to sue in a forum of
his choosing,3" Judge Friendly could find no unfairness in a result
which compels the insurer doing business in New York to litigate
there.I In addition, the court found unpersuasive the contention
that Seider resulted in undue hardship on the policy holder.34 The
court concluded, therefore, that there was no due process violation
in the application of the Seider procedure in O'Connor.35
32 579 F.2d at 201. The court noted "'a movement away from the bias favoring the
defendant' in matters of personal jurisdiction "toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that
the defendant come to him" when there is a sufficient basis for doing so.'" Id. (quoting
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969)
(quoting von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1966))). This statement is difficult to reconcile with the district
court's recognition of the pro-defendant bias enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shaffer.
See 437 F. Supp. at 996. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), commenting upon the
pro-plaintiff bias that some commentators suggested existed after McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Supreme Court emphatically stated that despite the
convenience of the plaintiff in suing at home, the test was whether the defendant had suffi-
cient contacts with the forum. 357 U.S. at 254. The Shaffer Court relied heavily upon Hanson,
see 433 U.S. at 215-16, and its ruling that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny," id. at
212 (emphasis added). This would seem to indicate that the Court is primarily concerned with
fairness as judged from the defendant's vantage point. Several courts and commentators also
have expressed the opinion that it is the defendant who needs protection against unfair
assertions of jurisdiction: "Simply stated, plaintiff contacts cannot cure a jurisdictional de-
fect that derives from a lack of defendant contacts with the forum." Jonnet v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1141 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); accord, Smit, supra note
2, at 611-12; Pre-Judgment Attachment, supra note 5, at 345; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner and
the Seider Doctrine, 39 U. Prrr L. REv. 747, 766 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Seider Doctrine].
1 579 F.2d at 201-02. In balancing the insurer's interest in having the suit brought where
the tort occurred against the plaintiff's interest in suing in New York, the court emphasized
that the insurer maintained an office in New York and regularly transacted business there.
Id. at 201. Thus, due process would be satisfied, and jurisdiction over the defendant would
exist, if the insurer had sufficient contacts with New York so as to be considered "doing
business" in the state. Id. at 200-01 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317-19 (1945)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 47 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
1 579 F.2d at 201-02. The court believed it unlikely that a Seider judgment would be
given collateral estoppel effect in another jurisdiction since 'the whole theory behind
[Seider] is that it is in effect a direct action against the insurer and the [insurer] rather
than the insured will conduct the defense."' Id. at 201 (quoting Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410
F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969)); cf. Note, Direct-Action
Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-law Problems, 74 HARv. L. REv. 357, 367-69
(1960) (collateral estoppel effect should be given to direct actions against the insurer). But
see note 63 infra.
11 579 F.2d at 202. On appeal, Lee-Hy Paving also contested the district court's ruling
that New York law should be applied in the wrongful death action. Id. Under Virginia law,
since O'Connor's employer and Lee-Hy Paving were both engaged in developing a shopping
center and therefore would be considered in the "same employ," Mrs. O'Connor's sole remedy
would be workmen's compensation benefits. Id. at 203; see 9A VA. CODE §§ 65.1-5, -29, -35,
-40, -103 (1950 & Supp. 1978). On the other hand, if New York law was applied, the plaintiff
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Intermeat and O'Connor typify the reevaluation of the tradi-
tional bases of quasi in rem jurisdiction that will be necessary in the
post-Shaffer era. Under the Shaffer rule, in order to acquire in rem
jurisdiction, the predicate must be sufficient to justify exercising
"jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing. ' 31 Thus, the
assertion of jurisdiction over property is not to be based solely upon
theories of territorial power,3s but rather is to be governed by the due
process standard generally applicable to assertions of in personam
jurisdiction.3 1 In mandating that this constitutional inquiry be made
in the face of a challenge to any form of state jurisdiction, the Court
has rejected the idea that jurisdiction may be predicated on the
fortuitous presence of intangible property within the forum state. 9
It is submitted that, in Intermeat, the Second Circuit correctly
followed the Supreme Court's mandate in concluding that, although
the attached debt was unrelated to the cause of action, the defen-
dant's contacts with New York made the assertion of jurisdiction by
New York fair and appropriate. 0 Intermeat illustrates that the cur-
would have a wrongful death cause of action. See N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1
(McKinney 1967).
Noting that the forum state's law governs the choice of law rules to be applied, 579 F.2d
at 203 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)), the O'Connor court
referred to New York's strong policy of offering its residents the benefits of more favorable
New York law and concluded that New York law was controlling. Id. at 205-06. The court's
interpretation of New York law would appear to be correct. See, e.g., Neuman v. Dunham,
39 N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1976); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div.
2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1969). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Seider
v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 409, 437-46 (1978).
11 433 U.S. at 207 (quoting RATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLcr OF LAWs § 56, Introduc-
tory Note (1971)); see note 5 supra.
I See 433 U.S. at 212. The Supreme Court stated that assertions of jurisdiction predi-
cated on territorial power were based on "ancient form[s] without substantial modern justi-
fication" and "would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair
to the defendant." Id.
1 Id. In Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th
Cir. 1977), the Eighth Circuit stated that the factors to be considered in determining whether
the minimum contacts standard is satisfied are "the nature and quality of the contacts with
the forum state; . . . the quantity of contacts with the forum state; . . . the relation of the
cause of action to the contacts; . . . the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for
its resident; and. . . the convenience of the parties." Id. at 1209. It is important to note that
the Aaron court stated that the last two factors are 'secondary factors' . . . and are not
determinative." Id. at 1210 n.5.
In explaining the requirements of the minimum contacts test, the Supreme Court has
stated that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(emphasis added). See Pre-Judgment Attachment, supra note 5, at 344; Seider Doctrine,
supra note 32, at 763-64.
433 U.S. at 207-08.
' See 575 F.2d at 1023; notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra. It is of interest to note
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rent utility of the quasi in rem doctrine lies in situations where in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would theoreti-
cally be available under the due process standard of minimum con-
tacts, but is impossible to assert due to a state's narrowly drawn
long-arm statute.41 In this sense, jurisdiction based on the attach-
ment of property located within the forum state can be thought of
as an alternate form of long-arm jurisdiction.4" While a plaintiff
may be given the opportunity to secure at least partial satisfaction
that the Intermeat court declined to pass upon the constitutionality of New York's attach-
ment statute which does not require that the defendant's contacts with the forum be consid-
ered prior to attachment of the property. See note 6 supra. By limiting the exercise of quasi
in rem jurisdiction under New York's attachment statute to those cases in which defendants
possess the required contacts with the forum, it appears that the Second Circuit has engrafted
restrictions on the statute which continue its viability. This approach is consistent with the
general rule of statutory construction that statutes should be construed to uphold their
constitutionality. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917
(1917); Marcellus v. Kern, 170 Misc. 281, 283, 10 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1939); N.Y. STATUTES § 150(c) (McKinney 1971).
A proposed amendment to the NYCPLR would incorporate the minimum contacts test
into New York's long-arm statute, thereby permitting out of state service based on attach-
ment jurisdiction. The proposed amendment states in pertinent part:
(b) Property or debt forming the basis of non-personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff
may cause any property belonging to the defendant or debt owing to him, against
which a money judgment may be enforced. . ., to be attached. . ., thereby giving
the court jurisdiction to the extent and value of the property or debt attached,
provided that plaintiff demonstrate minimum contacts with the state sufficient to
conform to due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the
constitution of the United States. In determining the existence of minimum con-
tacts the court shall consider:
1. the plaintiff's relationship to the state;
2. the relationship of plaintiff's cause of action to the state;
3. the defendant's relationship to the state;
4. any benefit accruing to the defendant because of the relationship of his
property or debt to the state;
5. the relationship of the garnishee to the state;
6. whether the property is tangible or intangible and if tangible, whether it
is permanently or temporarily located in the state;
7. whether there is another forum reasonably convenient to plaintiff in which
he can obtain adequate relief.
Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to Revision of
Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Related Provisions in Article 3 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules, [19781 N.Y. LAw REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1978] N.Y. Laws 1647, 1653
(McKinney).
1' See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner, An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U.
KAN. L. REv. 61, 78 (1977); Leathers, supra note 5, at 25; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner; Reshaping
the Contours of State Court Jurisdiction, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 87, 105 (1977). Cf. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court permitted
quasi in rem jurisdiction where in personam jurisdiction not permitted under state law).
,1 Casad, supra note 41, at 79; Leathers, supra note 5, at 25; Note, Minimum Contacts
and Jurisdictional Theory in New York: The Effect of Shaffer v. Heitner, 42 ALBANY L. REv.
294, 306-07 (1978).
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of his claim, however, the relief available would be limited to the
value of the attached property.' To the extent that the value of
the property will often be less than thejudgment sought, it will be
preferable for the plaintiff to proceed in personam against the de-
fendant in another state."
With respect to Seider-attachments, it is submitted that under
the approach utilized by the Second Circuit in O'Connor, the re-
quirements of Shaffer are not satisfied. Implicitly recognizing that
the named defendant's contacts with New York were insufficient to
justify an assertion of jurisdiction by New York, the O'Connor court
de-emphasized the inconvenience to the insured and considered the
insurer the real party in interest. This approach would appear to
ignore the realities by which the court professed to be guided since
it is clear that the hamed defendant will suffer to his financial
detriment.46 Appearance at trial, or at the giving of a deposition, will
often prove to be expensive and time-consuming. 7 In addition, a
judgment rendered against an insurer will likely result in an in-
crease in the defendant's insurance premiums. 8 Finally, if the in-
surer fulfills its obligation by defending and indemnifying in the
Seider action, the insured may be deprived of his contractual right
to a defense in a subsequent in personam suit based on the same
accident."
13 See Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886); Developments, supra note 2,
at 948.50; note 3 supra.
" See SIEGEL, supra note 2, at § 101; Casad, supra note 41, at 78.
' 579 F.2d at 200. While some point out that the named defendant suffers minimal
financial deprivation, the Shaffer Court appeared to consider the magnitude of the loss
unimportant:
It is true that the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem action is limited
by the value of the property, but that limitation does not affect the argument. The
fairness of subjecting a defendant to state-court jurisdiction does not depend on the
size of the claim being litigated.
433 U.S. at 207 n.23 (emphasis added); accord, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
11 Justice Powell, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in O'Connor, noted the extent
to which the named defendant would be affected by the suit and concluded that Seider
violates due process. 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) denying cert. to O'Connor
v. Le-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
" See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 99 S. Ct. 639, 640 (1978) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) denying cert. to O'Connor v. Lee.Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978);
Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488,495 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 7A J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN
& A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CIvL PRAcTIcE, 6202.06a at Supp. 14 (Supp. 1978); Note, Shaffer
v. Heitner; The Tide of Due Process Comes in on the Quasi in Rem Sandcastle, 14 CAL. W.L.
REv. 418, 447 (1978); McLaughlin, Seider v. Roth-A Hardy Weed, N.Y.L.J., June 14, 1978,
at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 1.
" 7A J. WEINSTEIN, H. KoRN, & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACICE, 6202.06a at
Supp. 14 (Supp. 1978).
,1 Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 495 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see N.Y. Cirv. PRAc.
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Notwithstanding the unfairness accruing to the named defen-
dant under the direct action analysis employed in O'Connor,50 the
claim's nexus to the forum would also appear to be tenuous. While
a state has an interest in providing residents with a forum to sue
nonresident tortfeasors, 5' this interest lessens when the tort occurs
outside the state.52 In addition, the site of the tort, the witnesses to
LAiV § 6201, commentary at 76 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); Siegel, Simpson Upholds Sei-
der-Problems for Both Sides, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1968, at 1, col. 3, at 4, col. 5.
While the insured has paid premiums in order to be indemnified in case of an accident
and to have attorneys available to defend him if needed, it is possible that these obligations
could be extinguished if a judgment is entered against the defendant for the face value of
the policy. Section 6204 of the NYCPLR provides in pertinent part: "A person who, pursuant
to an order of attachment, pays or delivers. . . money. . . in which a defendant has or will
have an interest, . . . is discharged from his obligation to the defendant to the extent of the
payment or delivery." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6204 (McKinney 1963).
0 In Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969), the Second Circuit utilized a direct action analysis in upholding Seider. Many com-
mentators have criticized this type of analysis. See Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles,
supra note 7, at 558-60; Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, "43 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 58, 70-72 (1968); Seider Doctrine, supra note 32, at 767-68; Comment, Podolsky v.
Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. Rsv. 1426,
1438 n.54 (1968). But see Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-
Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. REv. 357 (1960).
In 1973, a bill was introduced in the New York legislature that would have created a
direct action procedure essentially identical to the Seider procedure. See Rosenberg, Proposed
Direct Action Statute, SImTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 264 (1971). This proposal
was passed by the legislature and subsequently was vetoed by Governor Wilson because of
drafting problems. Governor's Veto Message, reprinted in [1973] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 349. The
legislature did not subsequently act on a similar measure. Some commentators have sug-
gested that by viewing Seider as a direct action procedure, the judiciary has trespassed upon
legislative functions. See, e.g., SIEGEL, supra note 2, at § 106; McLaughlin, supra note 47, at
1, col. 1.
51 See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). The Watson
Court, in sustaining the constitutionality of Louisiana's direct action statute, emphasized
that the plaintiff's injury took place within the state. Id. at 72-73. In finding that the forum
had a substantial interest in the litigation, the court reasoned that when the accident occurs
in the state the persons injured or killed would most likely be Louisiana residents, the injuries
would require treatment by Louisiana hospitals, and the state's courts would provide the
most convenient forum for trial. Id. at 72.
Seider can be distinguished from the Louisiana procedure on several grounds. First, in a
Seider action the injury occurs outside the state. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106,
115 (1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Second, in a Seider
action, there is great potential for inconvenience to everyone involved except the plaintiff.
410 F.2d at 115 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
In contrast to the judicially-created Seider doctrine, most statutory direct actions require
that the accident occur within the state or that the contract of insurance be executed within
the state. This gives the forum a nexus with the cause of action. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-7 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 803.04(2)(a)
(1975). But see P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2001, 2003(1) (1976).
52 See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 99 S. Ct. 639, 640 (1979) (mem.) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978);
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 114-16 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert.
1979] SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
it and the named defendant himself would have no contact with the
forum, bringing into question arguments that a relationship be-
tween the forum and the claim exist. 3
As occurred in O'Connor, New York's choice of law rules favor
applying the law of the forum in actions where jurisdiction is based
on a Seider attachment." This approach has the effect of aggravat-
ing the unfairness of the Seider doctrine since it may result in liabil-
ity greater than that which could have been possible had personal
jurisdiction been obtained in the state where the wrong occurred. 5
Shaffer stands for the proposition that all assertions of state juris-
diction must be fair to the defendant. The objectionable conse-
quences that may result from choice of law rules in the forum ac-
quiring quasi in rem jurisdiction are further evidence that, with
regard to considerations of fairness, Seider jurisdiction is deficient.
It was generally assumed that Seider actions would be the first
casualty of the minimum contacts standard adopted in Shaffer."
Although the sui generis view of Seider taken by the O'Connor court
prevented this occurrence, it seems unlikely that other jurisdictions
will follow. For example, in Camire v. Scieszka, 57 the New Hamp-
denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Seider Doctrine, supra note 32, at 765-67.
0 The O'Connor court reasoned that the defendant purchased the insurance policy to
protect against the liability involved in a Seider action and, "since the obligation to defend
clearly encompasses the litigation," the cause of action is sufficiently related to the attached
debt. 579 F.2d at 199. It would seem obvious, however, that in a Seider action, the insured is
not invoking the benefit of the forum state's protection. Further, the "source of the underlying
controversy" is usually a tort committed by the insured which seems to be independent of
the attached property. The attached property would be related to the cause of action when
the policy is attached to secure satisfaction of the judgment after the defendant is declared
liable. Under these circumstances, the parties are actually litigating the rights and obliga-
tions arising out of the policy. See Torres v. Townmotor, Inc. 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Alford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 511, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504 (4th Dep't 1978)
(Hancock, J., concurring).
Some courts have held that if the defendant's contacts with the forum are minimal or
isolated, the cause of action must arise out of the contact. E.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
319 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1963); L.D. Reader Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d
768, 773 n.10 (9th Cir. 1959); accord, 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25[5] at 4-266 (2d ed.
1978).
u See note 35 supra.
51 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 639 (1978); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856
(1973); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908,298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (lst Dep't 1969). Because
New York does not allow limitations on recoveries in wrongful death actions, the application
of New York law resulted in an increase in liability of the defendant. See 579 F.2d at 203-06;
The Survey, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 182 (1978); note 35 supra.
56 Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 23 (1978); Note,
Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory in New York; The Effect of Shaffer v. Heitner,
42 ALB. L. Rav. 294, 311 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions
Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 393, 418 (1978).
' 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
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shire Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of a Seider-type
action and held that, since the state's only connection with the
claim was the residence of the plaintiff, asserting jurisdiction would
be inconsistent with "'principles of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."''' 8 Implicitly rejecting a direct action analysis,59 the court con-
cluded that, absent special circumstances, a uniform test should be
employed to review the constitutionality of all assertions of jurisdic-
tion. 0
It appears that several procedures peculiar to quasi in rem ju-
risdiction will have to be reevaluated as a result of Shaffer. For
example, ex parte attachments utilized to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction may no longer be viable, as pre-attachment notice and a
hearing regarding the propriety of the attachment"' would appear
Id. at 283, 358 A.2d at 399 (quoting Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626,
628 (1974)). Earlier, in Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court had adopted the Seider procedure. Since the Forbes defendant
was a New York resident, one federal court held that the New Hampshire procedure was
retaliatory in nature and applicable only when the defendant was a resident of a state which
utilized the Seider procedure. Robitaille v. Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977, 978 (D.N.H. 1974).
This view was later rejected in Rocca v. Kenny, 381 A.2d 330, 331 (1977).
51 116 N.H. at 283, 358 A.2d at 399. In Camire, the accident occurred in Connecticut and
the defendant was a Missouri resident, id. at 284, 358 A.2d at 398, who had "in no way
invoked New Hampshire jurisdiction by entering [the] State." Id. at 285, 358 A.2d at 399.
Noting that quasi in rem jurisdiction is restricted by the same" 'general principles governing
jurisdiction over persons,'" the court held that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
would be improper. Id. (quoting Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960
(1957)).
10 116 N.H. at 285, 358 A.2d at 399. Camire was cited with approval in Shaffer. See 433
U.S. at 205. After Shaffer, New Hampshire reaffirmed Camire in Rocca v. Kenney, 381 A.2d
330 (1977). New Hampshire is not the only jurisdiction to adopt and later reject the Seider
doctrine. California adopted Seider in Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1973). Only three years after it was first adopted, however, the California Supreme
Court criticized the Seider doctrine and overruled Turner. Javoreck v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976).
11 In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90, 91 n.23 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized
that ex parte attachments deprive people of their property without notice and an opportunity
to be heard and thus are constitutionally deficient. Id. at 80-81. It was recognized, however,
that there were "'extraordinary situations' that justif [ied] postponing notice and opportun-
ity for a hearing." Id. at 90. One exception noted by the Court is when the attachment serves
as a predicate for jurisdiction. Id. at 91 n.23.
In Shaffer it was noted that the Delaware court's opinion was primarily concerned with
whether it was necessary to give the defendants notice and the opportunity for a hearing prior
to the attachment of their property. 433 U.S. at 194. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), the Delaware court concluded that such a proce-
dure was not required. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 235 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub
nom. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Indicating that Ownbey may not be "consis-
tent with more recent decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause," 433 U.S. at 194 n.10,
the Shaffer Court intimated that jurisdictional attachments were not "extraordinary situa-
tions" under the Fuentes standard. Id. The Supreme Court's language, coupled with the
decisions of other courts that require notice and a hearing prior to jurisdictional attachment,
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necessary to ensure fairness. Moreover, since all assertions of juris-
diction must be fair, in most situations there will no longer be a need
for a limited appearance."2 Similarly, the notion that collateral es-
toppel should not attach to a quasi in rem judgment will have to be
reconsidered.13
It is suggested that a logical development in state court juris-
diction would be for those states with restrictive long arm statutes
to amend them in order to encompass all assertions of jurisdiction
permitted by due process." Until this occurs, quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion will have utility as an alternative means to acquire jurisdiction
over persons who have sufficient contacts with the forum state to
satisfy the minimum contacts test . 5
John F. Finston
see, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); Mississippi Chem. Corp.
v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1977), indicates a trend towards
requiring these procedures in quasi in rem actions. See Pre-Judgment Attachment, supra
note 5, at 331-35.
62 A limited appearance allows the defendant to defend on the merits without subjecting
himself to personal liability. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 210 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286
(1953), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954);
Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916). See generally Carrington,
Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 Omo ST. L. J. 381 (1963); Curie, Attachment
and Garnishment in Federal Courts, 59 MicH. L. REV. 337 (1961); Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 833-35 (1952). This procedure was developed to
protect the interests of a defendant who would otherwise be put in the position of having to
consent to personal jurisdiction in order to defend his interest in attached property or refuse
to defend and have a default judgment entered against him. The opportunity for a limited
appearance, however, is not constitutionally required in quasi in rem actions. See, e.g.,
United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 58 F.R.D. 469, 478-81 (D. Del. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Greyhound Corp. v.
Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 236 (Del. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977). Since Shaffer requires that assertions of jurisdiction be fair and reasona-
ble, the need to protect the defendant has diminished and the major justification for a limited
appearance appears to have been weakened. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11,
Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978); Leathers, supra note 5, at 25; Pre-Judgment Attach-
ment, supra note 5, at 337-40.
63 At the present time, collateral estoppel effect is not given to quasi in rem actions for
several reasons. First, the defendant usually is required to defend in a forum where an in
personam judgment would violate due process. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
68.1(e)(iii), Comment j at 182 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). In addition, it is argued that if
collateral estoppel effect were given to a quasi in rem judgment, the utility of a limited
appearance would be abrogated. See Carrington, supra note 62, at 394.
"1 See note 44 supra. Some states do have broad long-arm statutes which allow their
courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process. See, e.g., ALA. R.
Civ. P. 4.2(a)(1); ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1973); CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1969); VA. CODE § 8.01-330 (1977).
93See note 41 supra.
